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Advertising Share of Voice and Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
Integrating literature in marketing, finance and accounting, this study examines the impact of 
a firms’ advertising share of voice (ASOV) on investors’ uncertainty about its future financial 
performance, i.e., firms’ idiosyncratic risk. Drawing on signaling theory, authors propose that 
ASOV serves as a signal for investors such that higher ASOV reduces idiosyncratic risk. 
Consistent with this argument, analysis of 2,777 publicly listed firms over a two-decade 
period (1995-2014) shows that ASOV has a significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. 
In addition, consistent with the argument that ASOV is a more credible signal when firms 
have higher cash flows; authors find that the negative impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk 
is stronger for firms with higher cash flows. Similarly, results support arguments that ASOV 
is a more appropriate signal for firms that have low quality disclosures and are in industries 
that are more competitive. Taken together, this study identifies specific conditions under 
which senior managers and financial analysts can expect ASOV to be a valuable marketing 
instrument to lower a firms’ idiosyncratic risk. 
 
Keywords: advertising share of voice, signaling, idiosyncratic risk, accounting, marketing-
finance interface 
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Advertising agencies and trade publications frequently report and underscore the importance 
of a firm’s advertising share of voice (see Advertising Weekly 2016). Financial analysts, also 
consider advertising share of voice (ASOV) an important metric. For example, Goldman 
Sachs financial analysts raised concerns about McDonald’s future earnings as “… it is losing 
advertising share of voice,” (Wall Street Journal 2013). Senior managers too echo this view. 
For example, Marvin Ellison, the CEO of JC Penney, notes in an earnings conference call 
that “we are putting more dollars into marketing just to make sure that our share of voice is 
strong” (JC Penney 2016). Similarly, Bill Simon, the CEO of Walmart notes, “We have a 
comprehensive marketing plan that's designed to ensure we have the number one share of 
voice” (Walmart 2013). 
Given that firms invest significant resources in trying to maintain or enhance ASOV, it 
is important to assess its impact on the financial risk of a firm. Examining the impact of 
managerial actions, such as, ASOV, on financial risk of a firm is an important consideration 
for senior managers, analysts, and investors (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). Indeed, 
Hanssens and Pauwels (2016, p. 182) note that “marketing’s ability to managing business risk 
is an integral part of its value creation.” Accordingly, the primary objective of this study is to 
examine the impact of ASOV on the financial risk of a firm.  
We examine financial risk of a firm as reflected in the idiosyncratic risk of its stock 
returns, i.e., the volatility in the stock returns of a firm that is not due to market-wide factors, 
but is due to the firm-specific factors (see Ang et al. 2006). Idiosyncratic risk accounts for 
almost 85% of risk of stock returns (see Goyal and Santa-Clara 2003). Recent research 
suggests that idiosyncratic risk is a better indicator of the financial risk of the firm than the 
overall market risk (see Atkeson, Weill, and Eisfeld 2014). Senior managers are also 
concerned about idiosyncratic risk because their compensation is tied to stock options (see 
Brown and Kapadia 2007). Importantly, idiosyncratic risk has a significant impact on both 
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discretionary spending (see Chakravarty and Grewal 2011) and the investment decisions 
made by managers (see Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajsek 2014). The study seeks to make two 
contributions: 
First, we present the first study that examines the impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk 
using a large-scale database of 2,777 publicly listed firms over a 20-year period. Drawing on 
the proposition that ASOV is a signal that can provide valuable information to investors 
(Chemmanur and Yan 2009; Joshi and Hanssens 2010), we propose that higher ASOV lowers 
investors’ uncertainty about future firm performance, and therefore reduces a firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. Consistent with this argument, we find that ASOV has a significant 
negative impact on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk. As such, the study is responsive to recent calls 
for examining the risk implications of marketing actions (e.g., Hanssens and Pauwels 2016). 
In addition, by bringing to fore the risk implications of ASOV, this study complements prior 
literature, which shows that ASOV has a positive effect on metrics such as market-share and 
profits (Steenkamp and Fang 2011) and firm value (McAlister et al. 2016). 
Second, we synthesize marketing literature with insights from finance and accounting 
to propose that the negative impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is stronger when investors 
consider it as a more credible and appropriate signal. As such, this study responds to a recent 
call that “identifying contingency factors that may affect the strength of marketing-
performance chain is urgent” (Katsikeas et al. 2016, p. 16). Consistent with the argument that 
ASOV is a more credible signal when firms have higher cash flows, we find that the negative 
impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is stronger for firms with higher cash flows. In 
addition, we propose that ASOV is a more appropriate signal in contexts where investors 
need more information to understand future firm performance. Consistent with the proposed 
hypotheses, we find that the negative impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is stronger for 
firms with lower financial disclosure quality. We also find that ASOV is a more appropriate 
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signal for investors for firms in more competitive industries where it is difficult to predict 
future firm performance. Taken together, we identify specific conditions under which ASOV 
is more (or less) likely to be a useful marketing instrument to lower idiosyncratic risk. 
HYPOTHESES 
ASOV and Idiosyncratic Risk 
Idiosyncratic risk reflects investors’ uncertainty about the future cash flows of a firm such 
that greater uncertainty about future cash flows means higher idiosyncratic risk (Srinivasan 
and Hanssens 2009). As such, in examining the impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk, it is 
important to consider whether ASOV is likely to provide useful information to investors 
about its future cash flows.  
Investors consider advertising spending as a signal that can provide information about 
the future financial performance of a firm (see Chemmanur and Yan 2009; Joshi and 
Hanssens 2010). Indeed, advertising is not cheap talk, and is expensive for the firm; both in 
terms of the direct cost of doing so, but also in terms of the potential damage to the firm 
reputation if the performance of its offerings does not meet customer expectations (see Jain 
and Wu 2000, p. 938). Building on this perspective, we consider ASOV as a signal for 
investors due to two reasons.  
First, building and maintaining ASOV is expensive, as firms must commit resources 
in doing so. That is, ASOV is a costly signal. Second, ASOV is likely to translate into higher 
brand awareness (e.g., Draganska and Klapper 2011), leading to higher sales (McAlister et al. 
2016) and market share (Pollay et al. 1996). Higher ASOV is also likely to allow a firm to 
charge higher relative price (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001). Recent research also shows that 
higher ASOV is likely to result in higher customer retention (Datta, Foubert, Van Heerde 
2015). Taken together, these findings suggest that from an investor’s perspective, ASOV is a 
valuable signal such that higher ASOV means greater stability of future cash-flows. In other 
5 
 
words, investors face less uncertainty about the future cash-flows of a firm that has higher 
ASOV. Therefore, we expect: 
H1: The higher the ASOV of a firm, the lower its idiosyncratic risk. 
A Contingency Approach: Credibility and Appropriateness of the Signal of ASOV 
Literature on signaling theory suggests that the effectiveness of a signal is likely to depend on 
credibility and appropriateness of a signal (e.g., Connelly et al. 2011; Kirmani and Rao 2000; 
Moenaert and Souder 1996). For example, Saboo and Grewal (2013) propose that investors’ 
reaction to signals related to customer and competitor orientation depends on the credibility 
and appropriateness of these signals. Similarly, Kirmani and Rao (2000) suggest that the 
credibility and appropriateness of signals are important when firms signal unobservable 
product quality. Therefore, we propose that value of ASOV as a signal is likely to depend on 
the extent to which investors consider ASOV to be a credible and appropriate signal.  
Credibility of ASOV as a Signal 
Cash-flows. Cash-flows are an important indicator of financial health (Vorhies, 
Morgan, and Autry 2009) and resources available to a firm (Bernardo and Chowdhry 2002). 
A firm with higher cash-flows is likely to have greater resources to maintain the investments 
required to sustain its market-based assets and capabilities (Katsikeas et al. 2016). As such, 
higher ASOV by a firm with higher cash-flows is likely to be considered a more credible 
signal because the firm has the resources available to maintain or even enhance its ASOV.  
Firm ability to maintain its ASOV is an important consideration for investors because 
it serves as an assurance that they can expect the firm performance to be sustainable. In 
contrast, higher ASOV of a firm with lower cash-flows is likely to be viewed as a less 
credible signal because investors are likely to have doubts about the firm’s ability to maintain 
its ASOV. That is, the impact of ASOV on investors’ uncertainty about future firm 
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performance is likely to be weaker if the firm has lower (as compared to higher) cash-flows. 
Therefore, we expect: 
H2: The negative impact of ASOV on the idiosyncratic risk of a firm is stronger 
(weaker) for firms with higher (lower) cash-flows. 
 
Appropriateness of ASOV as a Signal 
Prior literature suggests that a signal is more appropriate for investors if there is high 
information asymmetry between them and managers (see Davila, Foster, and Gupta 2003; 
Janney and Folta 2006). Information asymmetry, in turn, can be present due to firm- or 
industry-level factors (see Connelly et al. 2011). Accordingly, we consider both firm- and 
industry-level factors to evaluate the appropriateness of ASOV as a signal.  
At the firm level, we examine the moderating impact of disclosure quality of a firm. 
Disclosure quality of publicly listed firms is a critical issue that is closely studied by 
regulators, analysts, and investors (see Healy and Palepu 2001). This is because high 
disclosure quality means lower information asymmetry between investors and firms, a key 
consideration for regulators such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). At the 
industry level, we consider competitive intensity and industry growth as they reflect 
information challenges for investors. For firms in highly competitive industries, it is more 
difficult for investors to assess their future performance as they are more likely to be faced 
with unexpected competitive actions (Hou and Robinson 2006). Similarly, it is more difficult 
for investors to predict future performance of firms in low growth industries as it is more 
difficult to anticipate their source of future cash-flows (Brauer and Wiersema 2012).  
Disclosure quality. Disclosure quality reflects the value of information that is 
provided by a firm to investors such that high disclosure quality reduces information 
asymmetry between a firm and investors, and therefore makes it easier for investors to predict 
future cash flows (see Chen, Miao, and Shevlin 2015; Gao 2010). The information provided 
by high ASOV is likely to be more useful for investors when the disclosure quality of a firm 
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is low, as compared to when it is high. This is because low disclosure quality means that the 
information asymmetry between firm and investors is high and therefore there is a greater 
need for additional information provided by high ASOV for investors. Therefore, we expect: 
H3: The negative impact of ASOV on the idiosyncratic risk of a firm is stronger 
(weaker) for firms with lower (higher) disclosure quality. 
 
Competitive Intensity. For investors, high competitive intensity in an industry means 
that it is more difficult to predict firm performance as the competitive dynamics in such 
industries are more difficult to grasp (Saboo and Grewal 2013). This is because the number of 
competitors is usually higher and the number of options available to customers are also 
higher in more competitive industries (see Bansal et al. 2016). As such, for investors there is 
a greater need for additional information in highly competitive industries (see Connelly et al. 
2011; Sanders and Boivie 2004). In contrast, if a firm is in a less competitive industry, it is 
relatively easier for investors to predict firm performance as there are fewer competitors to 
track and consumers also have fewer options (Giroud and Mueller 2011). As such, 
information provided by high ASOV is less valuable for investors in less competitive 
industries. Therefore, we expect: 
H4: The negative impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is stronger when the firm 
is in an industry with high (versus low) competitive intensity. 
 
Industry growth. High growth rate in an industry means that more resources and 
opportunities are available for firms in that industry (e.g., Brauer and Wiersema 2012). The 
availability of resources and opportunities, therefore, is likely to make it easier for investors 
to predict the future performance of firms in such industries because there are less threats 
which are likely to require more information to evaluate firm future performance (see Baum 
and Wally 2003). This, in turn, reduces the investors’ need for additional information for 
firms in high growth industries. In contrast, if a firm is in a low growth industry, it is more 
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difficult for investors to predict future performance. This is because it is more difficult to 
understand and identify the sources of future cash-flows of the firm if the industry itself is not 
growing and the resources are scarce (see Boyd 1995; Baum and Wally 2003). In such a 
scenario, the need for additional information to predict future cash-flows is higher for 
investors. As such, the value of information provided by ASOV for investors is likely to be 
higher if the firm is in a low growth industry. Therefore, we expect, 
H5: The negative impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is stronger when the firm 
is in a low (versus high) growth industry. 
 
METHOD 
Data 
We obtain accounting-related information from the COMPUSTAT annual database, stock 
prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and the Fama and French 
factors from Kenneth French’s website.1 In 1994, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) clarified the disclosure standard for advertising via Financial Reporting Release No. 
44 (FRR44). Therefore, to ensure that our sample represents a single regulatory paradigm, we 
focus on data after fiscal year 1995. In addition, given our focus on measuring ASOV in an 
industry, we only focus on industries where there are at least 5 firms that provide their 
advertising expenses. Finally, we follow standard practice in finance and exclude penny 
stocks, i.e., stocks whose price at the end of a fiscal year is less than $1, because such stocks 
have extreme illiquidity and could bias results (see Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal 2006, p. 
2368; Ball, Kothari, and Shanken 1995). Our sample consists of 2,777 firms and 16,978 firm-
year observations, over the 20-year period from fiscal year 1995 to 2014. 
Variables and Measures 
Dependent variable. We use the Fama and French four-factor (FF4) model to estimate 
the idiosyncratic risk of a firm (Carhart 1997; Fama and French 1993). We estimate Equation 
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1 on the daily stock returns of a firm following the release of the firm’s annual report and 
before the release of its annual report in the following year. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard 
deviation of the residuals from estimating Equation 1: 
(1) (Rijd – Rfd) = αij + βmij(Rmd – Rfd) + βsij(SMB)d + βhij(HML)d + βuij(UMD)d + εijd, 
where Rijd = daily return on stock of firm i in the industry j on day d, Rfd = daily risk-free 
return on day d, Rmd = daily return on a value-weighted market portfolio on day d, (SMB)d = 
Fama-French size portfolio on day d, (HML)d = Fama-French market-to-book ratio portfolio 
on day d, and (UMD)d = the momentum factor on day d. 
Advertising share of voice. Following McAlister et al. (2016), we measure a firm’s 
advertising share of voice (ASOV) as the firm’s annual advertising expenditure divided by 
total advertising expenditure in an industry (also see Steenkamp and Fang 2011). McAlister 
et al. (2016, p. 213) note that ASOV (i) is consistent with how consumers perceive and 
process information of advertisements (Sternthal and Lee 2005), (ii) takes into account the 
different levels of advertising across industries, and (iii) provides managerially relevant and 
insightful implications. Indeed, the impact of firm’s marketing action (e.g., advertising) is 
often determined by the competitive feature of the action relative to that of competitors in the 
industry (Reibstein and Wittink 2005). Thus, the measure of ASOV gives “a better sense of 
the wisdom for competitive responsiveness” (Reibstein and Wittink 2005, p. 8). 
Control variables. Table 1 outlines the definition, data sources, and supporting 
literature for the use of the control variables. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
First, we include firm-level control variables. We control for firm size by using total assets 
because firms with greater assets have more stable stock returns (Rego, Billett, and Morgan 
2009). In addition, we include cash flows because firms with higher cash flows have more 
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stable stock returns. Finally, we also control for firm financial leverage and liquidity as firms 
with higher leverage have higher idiosyncratic risk and those with higher liquidity are 
expected to have lower idiosyncratic risk (see Table 1). 
To isolate the impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk, it is also important to account 
for the quality of a firm’s financial disclosures. This is because firms with higher quality of 
disclosures have more stable returns (see Bushee and Noe 2000). Following recent research 
in accounting, we use the level of disaggregation of the financial reports of a firm to measure 
of the quality of its financial disclosures (see Chen, Miao, and Shevlin 2015). Specifically, 
the higher the level of disaggregation of the financial reports of a firm, the greater is the 
information available to investors, and therefore, the greater is the quality of its financial 
disclosures (see Chen, Miao, and Shevlin 2015, p. 1025-1030).  
Following Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015), we start by counting the non-missing 
items both in the firm’s balance sheet and its income statement. By using the nesting feature 
of the firm’s financial report, we calculate the ratio of non-missing items to the total items in 
the balance sheet and income statement.2 For the balance sheet, we identify 11 groups, which 
are associated with 25 second-level items and 93 subaccounts. We count the non-missing 
items in 93 subaccounts for the balance sheet and generate the value-weighted ratio of the 
non-missing items for each group based on the magnitude of the group over the total assets. 
For the income statement, we generate the equal-weighted ratio of the non-missing items to 
the total items. Then, we use the average of each ratio for the balance sheet and income 
statement as disclosure quality. High ratio indicates the high level of disaggregation in 
financial reporting, suggesting high disclosure quality. 
Second, we incorporate industry covariates to control for the extent to which industry 
conditions affect firm performance and risk (see Table 1). Consistent with recent research, we 
use the five-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to identify an 
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industry (e.g., Alvarez and Shimer 2011; Uslay, Altintig, and Winsor 2010). We control for 
competitive intensity by measuring the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) for each industry 
and subtracting it from 1 (e.g., Deb, David, and O’Brien 2017; Fang, Lee, and Yang 2015). 
Finally, we control for the industry growth (see Table 1).  Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Model 
Equation 3 outlines the model we use to test the hypotheses and Equation 2 represents the 
main-effects model without interaction terms: 
(2) IRijt = β0i + β1 ASOVijt  
+ β2 Cash Flowijt + β3 Disclosure Qualityijt  
+ β4 Competitive Intensityjt + β5 Industry Growthjt  
+ β6 Firm Sizeijt + β7 Leverageijt + β8 Liquidityijt 
+ ∑ γKk=1 k Yeart  + ηijt 
 
(3) IRijt = β0i + β1 ASOVijt  
   + β2 ASOVijt × Cash Flowijt + β3 ASOVijt × Disclosure Qualityijt  
   + β4 ASOVijt × Competitive Intensityjt + β5 ASOVijt × Industry Growthjt 
   + β6 Cash Flowijt + β7 Disclosure Qualityijt  
+ β8 Competitive Intensityjt + β9 Industry Growthjt 
   + β10 Firm Sizeijt + + β11 Leverageijt + β12 Liquidityijt 
+ ∑ γKk=1 k Yeart + ηijt 
 
where β0 is the intercept; β1 represents the main effect of ASOV on the idiosyncratic risk; β2-
β5 represent the coefficients of the moderating effects; IRijt denotes the idiosyncratic risk of 
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the firm i in industry j for fiscal year t. In addition, the model includes control variables 
outlined in Table 1 along with both firm-specific fixed effects (β0i) and year fixed effects 
(Yeart ). ηijt is a random error term for firm i in the industry j at fiscal year t. 
A Gaussian Copula Method for Addressing Endogeneity 
Extant literature in marketing suggests that advertising decision may be endogenous to firm 
performance because advertising expenditure is strategically determined in a firm (e.g., 
Sridhar et al. 2016). Therefore, we use the copula method proposed by Park and Gupta (2012) 
to address the endogeneity of ASOV (for empirical applications, see Mathys, Burmester, and 
Clement 2016; Datta, Foubert, and van Heerde 2015). In line with Park and Gupta (2012) and 
Datta, Foubert, and Van Heerde (2015), we generate the copula correction term for ASOV by 
using Equation 4: 
(4) Copula_ASOVijt = ϕ-1(HASOV(ASOVijt)), 
where ϕ-1 is the inverse of normal cumulative distribution function and HASOV() denotes the 
empirical cumulative distribution function of ASOV for firm i in the industry j at the fiscal 
year t. For identification, the endogenous variable needs to be non-normally distributed (Park 
and Gupta 2012). Both the histogram of ASOV (see Figure 1) and a Shapiro-Wilk test 
(w=0.515, z=22.353, p<0.001) ensure that the condition is satisfied. 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
Therefore, we include the copula correction term to address concerns related to endogeneity 
of ASOV. As such, the final model (Equation 5) is: 
 
(5) IRijt = β0i + β1 ASOVijt  
   + β2 ASOVijt × Cash Flowijt + β3 ASOVijt × Disclosure Qualityijt 
    + β4 ASOVijt × Competitive Intensityjt + β5 ASOVijt × Industry Growthjt 
   + β6 Cash Flowijt + β7 Disclosure Qualityijt  
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+ β8 Competitive Intensityjt + β9 Industry Growthjt 
+ β10 Firm Sizeijt + β11 Leverageijt + β12 Liquidityijt 
+ β13 Copula_ ASOVijt + ∑ γKk=1 k Yeart + ηijt 
 
Following Park and Gupta (2012), we calculate the standard errors of the estimates by using 
200 bootstrapping replications. We mean-center the variables for model estimation. 
RESULTS 
Main Effect 
Table 3 outlines the results of estimating Equation 5 (see Model 2, Table 3). In addition, we 
also include a simple “main-effects” model that includes all control variables outlined in 
Equation 5, but does not include the interaction terms (see Model 1, Table 3). As shown in 
Table 3, the estimation of the simple model provides significant support for the argument that 
ASOV lowers idiosyncratic risk of a firm (β1 = -0.004, p < 0.01).  
The Wald test for Model 2 shows that the model is significant (p < 0.001) and model 
fit statistics support the model with interaction terms (Model 2) over a main-effects only 
model (Model 1). The significant coefficient of the copula correction suggests that correcting 
for endogeneity of ASOV is indeed required (see Datta, Foubert, and Van Heerde 2015, p. 
225). In addition, control variables have expected effects on idiosyncratic risk. We find that 
firm size, cash flow, liquidity, disclosure quality, and industry growth have significant 
negative impact on idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, leverage and competitive intensity increase 
idiosyncratic risk. Importantly, ASOV has a significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk 
(β1 = -0.004, p < 0.05). H1, therefore, is supported.  
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
Moderating Effects 
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Firm-level: Consistent with H2, the interaction between ASOV and cash flow is negative and 
significant (β2 = -0.025, p < 0.05), i.e., the negative effect of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is 
stronger for firms with higher cash flows. We also find that the interaction between ASOV 
and disclosure quality is positive and significant (β3 = 0.056, p < 0.001). That is, the negative 
effect of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is stronger for firms with lower disclosure quality. H3, 
therefore, is supported.  
 Industry-level: Consistent with H4, the interaction between ASOV and competitive 
intensity is significant and negative (β4 = -0.019, p < 0.01). That is, the negative effect of 
ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is stronger for firms in industries with high competitive intensity. 
H5, however, is not supported as we find that the interaction between ASOV and industry 
growth is not significant (β5 = 0.004, p > 0.1).  
Sensitivity Analyses  
To examine the robustness of our results, we conduct multiple sensitivity analyses (see Table 
4). First, following Sridhar et al. (2016), we assess the sensitivity of results to sample 
composition by (a) dropping a random sample of 10% of the firms (Model 3), (b) removing 
the first two years (i.e., 1995 and 1996) of the sample (Model 4), and (c) removing the last 
two years (i.e., 2013 and 2014) of the sample (Model 5). Second, we examine the sensitivity 
of our conclusions to the use of alternative approaches for calculating the dependent variable, 
i.e., use of Fama and French (1993) model (Model 6), the market (Brown and Warner 1985) 
model (Model 7), and using simple stock return volatility (Sorescu and Spanjol 2008) 
measured by the standard deviation of daily returns (Model 8). As shown in Table 4, our 
conclusions remain largely unchanged across multiple sensitivity analyses.  
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
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DISCUSSION 
This study builds on and integrates literature in marketing, finance, and accounting to 
examine the impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk. We find that ASOV not only serves as a 
valuable signal for investors, but also that both firm and industry conditions have an impact 
on the credibility and appropriateness of this signal for investors. The study has implications 
for both marketing theory and managers. 
Implications for Marketing Theory 
The study presents the first theoretical and empirical examination of the impact of ASOV on 
investors’ uncertainty, i.e., idiosyncratic risk. The study, therefore, is responsive to the recent 
calls for research on risk aspects of marketing (e.g., Katsikeas et al. 2016). Indeed, Hanssens 
and Pauwels (2016, p. 183) highlight that risk analysis in marketing planning is one of the 
most promising areas for further research and is highly important “if marketing is to become 
an integral part of strategic and financial planning”.  
 As shown in panel (A) in figure 2, the negative impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk 
is stronger for firms with higher cash flows. In fact, ASOV does not have a significant effect 
on idiosyncratic risk for firms that have lower cash flows. This finding is consistent with the 
proposed argument that higher ASOV is a more credible signal for investors for firms that 
have higher cash flows because it signals firm’s capability to not only to maintain ASOV, but 
also to convert ASOV into financial outcomes such as sales and profits.  
[Figure 2 About Here] 
Importantly, by identifying cash flows as a boundary condition for the effects of 
ASOV on idiosyncratic risk, the study suggests that scholars should consider the moderating 
effects of cash flows when evaluating investors’ evaluation of other marketing signals. For 
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example, it would be interesting to examine the moderating effect of cash flows for the oft-
debated effects of customer satisfaction on firm value (e.g., Jacobson and Mizik 2009).   
 Consistent with the proposed hypothesis, we find that the negative impact of ASOV 
on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk is stronger for firms with low quality of disclosures (see Panel 
(B), Figure 2). In fact, for firms with higher disclosure quality, ASOV does not have a 
significant effect on idiosyncratic risk. This suggests that high ASOV plays an important role 
in lowering investors’ uncertainty especially when the quality of accounting disclosures is 
low. Low disclosure quality indicates high information asymmetry between investors and 
firms (Chen, Miao, and Shevlin 2015) and investors may suffer from insufficient information 
to forecast firm future performance. In this context, high ASOV is a more valuable and 
appropriate signal. This provides an insightful implication that ASOV, a marketing metric 
conveys useful and valuable information about firm performance to investors especially when 
there is insufficient information about the firm in financial markets.  
The study, therefore, brings to fore the importance of considering an accounting 
perspective (e.g., disclosure quality) in evaluating the information value of marketing 
metrics. As such, future studies can build on our finding and examine the information value 
of other marketing metrics across different values of firm disclosure quality.  
 Finally, results also show that high ASOV is a more appropriate signal for investors 
of firms in highly competitive industries. Panel (A) in Figure 3 shows that the negative 
impact of ASOV on a firm’s idiosyncratic risk is stronger when competitive intensity is 
higher. In contrast, if the firm is in an industry with lower competitive intensity, ASOV does 
not have a significant impact on idiosyncratic risk. The finding is consistent with the 
proposed argument that investors are likely to value ASOV more in a context where it is 
more difficult for them to understand the implications of competitive dynamics in an industry 
for future firm performance (Saboo and Grewal 2013).  
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Implications for Managers 
Based on the empirical findings and theoretical discussion, we outline the specific 
implications for senior managers, financial analysts, and regulators. A direct implication of 
the current study is that senior managers should assess the impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic 
risk when evaluating its return on investment. In addition, financial analysts should consider 
the impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk in their valuation models.  
A key contribution of the current study is that it identifies firm and industry specific 
boundary conditions under which ASOV is likely (or unlikely) to lower idiosyncratic risk. 
Specifically, if a firm has lower cash flows, then managers should recognize that investors are 
unlikely to find ASOV as a credible signal. In contrast, if the firm has high cash flows, 
investors are likely to consider ASOV as a credible signal that can lower idiosyncratic risk.  
Results also identify ASOV as an avenue for overcoming information asymmetry 
between managers and investors due to the lack of disclosure quality of a firm. Specifically, 
if a firm has poor disclosure quality, managers can use ASOV as an instrument for provide 
additional information to investors and therefore lower idiosyncratic risk. In addition, also 
find that ASOV can be useful for managers of firms operating in highly competitive 
industries because investors find it to be a more appropriate signal of additional information 
in such industries. 
In addition to managers, these results of direct import to regulators such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB). This is because both SEC and FASB seek to identify avenues for lowering the 
information asymmetry between the firm and investors. Given that ASOV has stronger 
impact on idiosyncratic risk in conditions of higher asymmetry (i.e., poor disclosure and 
higher competitive intensity), perhaps both SEC and FASB should encourage firms to report 
ASOV in their annual reports and/or communications to shareholders.  
18 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has some limitations that may guide fruitful avenues for further research. First, 
we acknowledge that the data used to test hypotheses consists of firms that disclose 
advertising spending. As such, our findings are applicable to firms that derive their 
competitive advantage from “differentiators” as opposed to cost reduction (see McAlister et 
al. 2016, p. 219) . Second, we hypothesize that the impact of ASOV on investors’ uncertainty 
is stronger when industry growth is low. Unfortunately, the empirical results do not support 
this hypothesis. This insignificant result might mirror an ongoing debate on advertising 
budget allocation during tough economic conditions (Edeling and Fischer 2016) as not all 
firms benefit from increasing advertising during unfavorable economic conditions 
(Srinivasan, Lilien, and Sridhar 2011). It is also possible that some investors will perceive 
high ASOV as more valuable while others may not when industry growth is low, making the 
moderating effect insignificant. Clearly, these are preliminary conjectures and more 
systematic research is required in this domain. 
Third, we focus only on investors’ uncertainty, i.e., a firm’s equity risk. However, 
there is another type of firm risks such as the debt holder risk. As prior literature points out, 
marketing research has paid less attention to debt holder risk although it is also important for 
firms’ risk management. Thus, it can be a fruitful avenue for further research to explore the 
impact of ASOV on debt holder risk (Katsikeas et al. 2016, p. 11).  
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
 
2 As Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015), we count the non-missing items of both the balance 
sheet and income statement in COMPUSTAT. 
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TABLE 1. VARIABLES, MEASURES, AND SUPPORTING LITERATURE 
 
Variable Measure Source Literature 
Dependent variable   
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Standard deviation of the residual of FF4 
model by using daily stock returns 
following the release of the firm’s annual 
report (10-K) and before the release of the 
subsequent annual report (10-K) 
CRSP Luo and Bhattacharya 
(2009); Osinga et al. 
(2011) 
Independent variables   
Advertising 
Share of Voice 
(ASOV) 
Annual advertising expenditure divided by 
total advertising expenditure in the industry 
COMPUSTAT McAlister et al. (2016); 
Steenkamp and Fang 
(2011) 
Cash Flow Net operating cash flow divided by total 
assets 
COMPUSTAT Gruca and Rego (2005) 
Disclosure 
Quality 
The level of disaggregation of the financial 
report of a firm 
COMPUSTAT Chen, Miao, and Shevlin 
(2015) 
Competitive 
Intensity 
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index for the 
industry (i.e., the sum of the squares of 
firms’ market shares in the industry) 
subtracted from 1 
COMPUSTAT Hou and Robinson (2006); 
Fang, Lee, and Yang 
(2015) 
Industry 
Growth 
Natural log of sales of the industry in the 
current fiscal year less natural log of sales 
of the industry in the previous fiscal year 
COMPUSTAT Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 
(2013); Pe’er, Vertinsky, 
and Keil (2016) 
Firm Size Natural log of total assets COMPUSTAT McAlister et al. (2016); 
Rego, Billett, and Morgan 
(2009) 
Leverage Total long-term debt divided by total assets COMPUSTAT Ferreira and Laux (2007); 
Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 
(2013) 
Liquidity Ratio of current assets to current liabilities COMPUSTAT Luo and Bhattacharya 
(2009); McAlister, 
Srinivasan, and Kim (2007) 
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
Variables            N          Mean           SD           Min         Max 
Correlation 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9 
1. Idiosyncratic Risk 16,978 0.034 0.020 0.008      0.130 1.000          
2. ASOV 16,978 0.070 0.153 0.000      0.991 -0.232 1.000         
3. Cash Flow 16,978 0.052 0.177 -1.144      0.355 -0.443 0.135 1.000       
4. Disclosure Quality 16,978 0.693 0.111 0.000      0.864 -0.349 -0.036 0.147 1.000      
5. Competitive Intensity 16,978 0.826 0.134 0.058      0.967 0.052 -0.253 -0.060 -0.028 1.000     
6. Industry Growth 16,978 0.059 0.134 -0.660      0.717 0.006 -0.044 -0.021 -0.096 0.089 1.000    
7. Firm Size 16,978 5.962 2.105 0.282    11.361 -0.551 0.458 0.368 0.113 -0.037 -0.044 1.000    
8. Financial Leverage 16,978 0.150 0.194 0.000      0.857 -0.080 0.129 0.007 -0.169 -0.010 -0.040 0.304 1.000   
9. Liquidity 16,978 2.865 2.572 0.177    23.060 0.071 -0.165 -0.085 0.112 0.070 0.017 -0.259 -0.250 1.000  
 
Notes: 
a. All values are rounded to the three decimals. 
b. We winsorize all variables at 1% to eliminate the influence of outliers. 
c. The descriptive statistics are based on the variables before mean-centering. 
d. Correlations in bold and italics are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 3. THE IMPACT OF ASOV ON IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK 
 
Model1: 
Main Effect Only 
Model2: 
Full Model 
 
Hypothesized Variables Coeff. (SE) Coeff (SE)  
ASOV -0.004 (0.002)*** -0.004 (0.002)** H1: Supported 
ASOV x Cash Flow   -0.025 (0.012)** H2: Supported 
ASOV x Disclosure Quality   0.056 (0.006)**** H3: Supported 
ASOV x Competitive Intensity   -0.019 (0.006)*** H4: Supported 
ASOV x Industry Growth   0.004 (0.004) H5: Not Supported 
Control Variables      
Intercept -0.004 (0.001)**** -0.004 (0.001)****  
Cash Flow -0.014 (0.001)**** -0.015 (0.001)****  
Disclosure Quality -0.019 (0.002)**** -0.018 (0.002)****  
Competitive Intensity 0.007 (0.003)*** 0.008 (0.003)***  
Industry Growth -0.002 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.001)**  
Firm Size -0.005 (0.000)**** -0.005 (0.000)****  
Financial Leverage  0.006 (0.001)**** 0.006 (0.001)****  
Liquidity -0.000 (0.000)**** -0.000 (0.000)****  
Copula_ASOV  0.002 (0.000)****  0.002 (0.001)****  
Firm Fixed Effects            YES          YES  
Year Fixed Effects            YES          YES  
Number of Observations 
(Number of Unique Firms) 
         16,978 
         (2,777) 
        16,978 
        (2,777) 
 
Wald χ2 (df)      8,854.79 (28)     7,356.98 (32)  
Wald Test Significance (p > χ2)         0.0000         0.0000  
Log Likelihood (df)     54,829.53 (29)    54,878.54 (33)  
Akaike Information Criterion (df)  -109,601.10 (29) -109,691.10 (33)  
Bayesian Information Criterion (df)  -109,376.60 (29) -109,435.70 (33)  
 
Notes: 
a. We calculate the standard errors of coefficients by bootstrapping with 200 replications. 
b. The bootstrapping replication is based on the clusters of the number of firms. 
c. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 (Two-tailed) 
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TABLE 4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
 
 
Model2: 
Full Model 
Model3: 
Dropping 
Random 10% 
of Firms 
Model4: 
Dropping 1995 
& 1996 
Model5: 
Dropping 2013 
& 2014 
Model6:  
Using FF3 
Model to 
Estimate DV 
Model7:  
Using Market 
Model to 
Estimate DV 
Model8:  
Using Stock 
Return Volatility 
as DV 
Hypothesized Effects Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
ASOV -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.006*** 
ASOV x Cash Flow -0.025** -0.028** -0.028** -0.019* -0.026** -0.026** -0.028** 
ASOV x Disclosure Quality  0.056****  0.054****  0.059****  0.055****  0.056****  0.057****  0.062**** 
ASOV x Competitive Intensity -0.019*** -0.023**** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021**** 
ASOV x Industry Growth  0.004  0.007*  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.003 
Control Variables        
Intercept -0.004**** -0.004**** -0.004**** -0.005**** -0.004**** -0.004**** -0.005**** 
Cash Flow -0.015**** -0.014**** -0.015**** -0.015**** -0.015**** -0.015**** -0.015**** 
Disclosure Quality -0.018**** -0.017**** -0.018**** -0.017**** -0.018**** -0.018**** -0.019**** 
Competitive Intensity  0.008***  0.009****  0.008***  0.007***  0.008***  0.008***  0.009*** 
Industry Growth -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
Firm Size -0.005**** -0.005**** -0.005**** -0.005**** -0.005**** -0.005**** -0.004**** 
Financial Leverage  0.006****  0.006****  0.005****  0.006****  0.006****  0.006****  0.006**** 
Liquidity -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000**** -0.000**** -0.000** 
Copula_ASOV  0.002****  0.002****  0.002****  0.002***  0.002****  0.002****  0.003**** 
Firm Fixed Effects   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Year Fixed Effects   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Number of Observations 
(Number of Unique Firms) 
 16,978 
 (2,777) 
15,340 
(2,499) 
16,079 
(2,684) 
15,336 
(2,643) 
 16,978 
 (2,777) 
 16,978 
 (2,777) 
 16,978 
 (2,777) 
Wald χ2 (df)  7356.98 (32) 8180.99 (32) 7388.02 (30) 6760.75 (30)  8094.28 (32)  7854.26 (32)  9888.63 (32) 
Wald Test Significance (p > χ2)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: a. We calculate the standard errors of the estimates by bootstrapping with 200 replications. 
          b. The bootstrapping replication is based on the clusters of the number of firms. 
          c. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
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FIGURE 1. TESTS FOR NON-NORMALITY OF ASOV 
 
(A) HISTOGRAM OF ASOV 
 
Probability 
Density 
 
                 ASOV 
(B) SHAPIRO-WILK TEST FOR NORMALITY 
Variable                    Observations     W           V                  z                Prob>z 
ASOV                        16,978           0.515       3785.354       22.353                 0.000 
 
Notes: 
a. In the histogram, the vertical axis represents probability density of each bar and the horizontal axis 
represents values of ASOV that range from 0 to 0.991. 
b. W indicates Shapiro-Wilk test statistic. V represents the index for departure from normality and large 
values indicates non-normality. z is z test statistic to evaluate the null hypothesis of normality. 
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FIGURE 2. 
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF ASOV ON IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK 
ACROSS CASH FLOW AND DISCLOSURE QUALITY 
 (A) Marginal Effects of ASOV on Idiosyncratic Risk 
Across Values of Cash Flow 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  10th %tile                                                     50th%tile                              90th %tile 
 (B) Marginal Effects of ASOV on Idiosyncratic Risk 
Across Values of Disclosure Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  10th %tile                                                     50th%tile                               90th %tile 
 
Notes: 
a. We use the values from only between 10 percentile and 90 percentile of the distribution of each moderating 
variable when drawing each plot. 
b.. The dotted line represents 95% confidence interval bands. 
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FIGURE 3. 
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF ASOV ON IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK 
ACROSS COMPETITIVE INTENSITY AND INDUSTRY GROWTH 
 (A) Marginal Effects of ASOV on Idiosyncratic Risk 
Across Values of Competitive Intensity 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
                                   10th %tile                                                             50th%tile                     90th %tile 
 (B) Marginal Effects of ASOV on Idiosyncratic Risk 
Across Values of Industry Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   10th %tile                                           50th%tile                                       90th %tile 
 
Notes: 
a. We use the values from only between 10 percentile and 90 percentile of the distribution of each moderating 
variable when drawing each plot. 
b. The moderating effect of industry growth on the impact of ASOV on idiosyncratic risk is not significant. 
c.. The dotted line represents 95% confidence interval bands. 
 
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
A
S
O
V
 o
n
 I
d
io
sy
n
cr
at
ic
 R
is
k
 
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
A
S
O
V
 o
n
 I
d
io
sy
n
cr
at
ic
 R
is
k
 
